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Abstract—Recently, an opinion dynamics model has been
proposed to describe a network of individuals discussing a set
of logically interdependent topics. For each individual, the set
of topics and the logical interdependencies between the topics
(captured by a logic matrix) form a belief system. We investigate
the role the logic matrix and its structure plays in determining
the final opinions, including existence of the limiting opinions, of
a strongly connected network of individuals. We provide a set
of results that, given a set of individuals’ belief systems, allow a
systematic determination of which topics will reach a consensus,
and which topics will disagreement in arise. For irreducible logic
matrices, each topic reaches a consensus. For reducible logic
matrices, which indicates a cascade interdependence relationship,
conditions are given on whether a topic will reach a consensus
or not. It turns out that heterogeneity among the individuals’
logic matrices, and a cascade interdependence relationship, are
necessary conditions for disagreement. This paper thus attributes,
for the first time, a strong diversity of limiting opinions to
heterogeneity of belief systems in influence networks, in addition
to the more typical explanation that strong diversity arises from
individual stubbornness.
Index Terms—opinion dynamics, social networks, multi-agent
systems, influence networks, agent-based models
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE has been great interest over the past few yearsin agent-based network models of opinion dynamics
that describe how individuals’ opinions on a topic evolve
over time as they interact [1], [2]. The seminal discrete-time
French–Harary–DeGroot model [3]–[5] (or DeGroot model
for short) assumes that each individual’s opinion at the next
time step is a convex combination of his/her current opinion
and the current opinions of his/her neighbours. This weighted
averaging aims to capture social influence, where individuals
exert a conforming influence on each other so that over
time, opinions become more similar (and thus giving rise to
the term “influence network”). For networks satisfying mild
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connectivity conditions, the opinions reach a consensus, i.e.
the opinion values are equal for all individuals.
Since then, and to reflect real-world networks, much focus
has been placed on developing models of increasing sophis-
tication to capture different socio-psychological features that
may be involved when individuals interact. The Hegselmann–
Krause model [6]–[8] introduced the concept of bounded
confidence, which is used to capture homophily, i.e. the phe-
nomenon whereby individuals only interact with those other
individuals whose opinion values are similar to their own.
The Altafini model [9]–[12] introduced negative edge weights
to model antagonistic or competitive interactions between
individuals (perhaps arising from mistrust). The Friedkin–
Johnsen model generalised the DeGroot model by introducing
the idea of “stubbornness”, where an individual remains (at
least partially) attached to his or her initial opinion [13], [14].
Of particular note is that the DeGroot and Friedkin–Johnsen
models have been empirically examined [14]–[16]. For more
detailed discussions on opinion dynamics modelling, we refer
the reader to [1], [2], [17].
Recently in [18], a multi-dimensional extension to the
Friedkin–Johnsen model was proposed to describe a network
of individuals who simultaneously discuss a set of logically
interdependent topics. That is, an individual’s position on
Topic A may influence his/her position on Topic B due
to his/her view of constraints or relations between the two
topics. Such interdependencies are captured in the model
by a “logic matrix”. This interdependence can greatly shift
the final opinion values on the set of topics since now
the interdependencies and the social influence from other
individuals both affect opinion values. The model is used in
[19] to explain that the shift in the US public’s opinions on
the topic of whether the 2003 Invasion of Iraq was justified
was due to shifting opinions on the logically interdependent
topic of whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The
set of topics, the interdependent functionalities between the
topics, and the mechanism by which an individual processes
such interdependencies forms a “belief system” as termed by
Converse in his now classical paper [20]. For networks where
all individuals have the same logic matrix, a complete stability
result is given using algebraic conditions in [18] and using
graph-theoretic conditions in [21]. Of course, the assumption
that all individuals have the same logic matrix is restrictive.
Heterogeneous logic matrices were considered in [19], but at
least one individual is required to exhibit stubbornness in order
to obtain a stability result.
This paper will also consider a generalisation of the multi-
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dimensional model proposed in [18] for the evolution of opin-
ions in belief systems, going beyond [18], [19] by analysing
the effects of the logic matrix, including especially heterogene-
ity of the logic matrices among the individuals, on the limiting
opinion distribution. We first establish a general convergence
result for the model with heterogeneous logic matrices on
strongly connected networks. Then, we provide a set of results
which enables the systematic determination of whether for
a given topic, the opinions of the individuals will reach a
consensus, or will reach a state of persistent disagreement.
We find that the nature of the logic structure, viz. the hetero-
geneity among the individuals of the logical interdependencies
between topics, and the structure itself, plays a major role
in determining whether opinions on a given topic reach a
consensus or fail to do so. If the logical interdependencies
do not have a cascade structure, then consensus is always
secured. When the logical interdependencies have a cascade
structure, and by considering topics at the top of a cascade
structure to be axiom(s) that an individual’s belief system
is built upon, we establish that discussion of the axiomatic
topics will lead to a consensus. In contrast, we discover that
persistent disagreement can arise in the topics at the bottom
of the cascade when certain types of heterogeneity exist in the
logic matrices. A preliminary work [22] considers the special
case of lower triangular logic matrices, but we go well beyond
that in this paper by considering general logic matrix structures
and providing a comprehensive account of the results.
We discover that if there is a failure to reach a consensus,
then it is typically not minor; in general a strong diversity
of opinions will eventually emerge. In more detail, a network
is said to exhibit weak diversity [23] if opinions eventually
converge into clusters where there is no difference between
opinions in the same cluster (consensus is the special case of
one single cluster). Strong diversity occurs when the opinions
converge to a configuration of persistent disagreement, with
a diverse range of values (there may be clusters of opin-
ions with similar, but not equal, values within a cluster).
Weak diversity is a common outcome in the Hegselmann–
Krause model, with the network becoming disconnected into
subgroups associated with the clusters. In strongly connected
networks, weak diversity also emerges in the Altafini model
(specifically polarisation of two opinion clusters) when the
network is “structurally balanced”. However, sign reversal of
some selected edges may destroy the structural balance of
the network, causing the opinions to converge to a consensus
at an opinion value of zero, indicating that the polarisation
phenomenon is not robust to changes in the network structure.
There has been a growing interest to study models which are
able to capture the more realistic outcome of strong diversity
in networks which remain connected [23], [24]. The DeGroot
model shows that social influence in a connected network
acts to bring opinions closer together until a consensus is
achieved, meaning some other socio-psychological process
must be at work to generate strong diversity. The Friedkin–
Johnsen model attributes strong diversity to an individual’s
stubborn attachment to his/her initial opinion [13]. In contrast,
[25] considers a model where an individual’s susceptibility
to interpersonal influence is dependent on the individual’s
current opinion; strong diversity is verified as a special case.
The papers [23], [24] consider two features that might give
rise to strong diversity, the first being “social distancing”,
and the second being an individual’s “desire to be unique”.
Experimental studies are inconclusive with regards to the
existence of ubiquitous and persistent antagonistic interper-
sonal interactions (there might be limited occurrences in the
network over short time spans) [18], while it is unlikely that
an individual has the same level of stubborn attachment to his
or her initial opinion value for months or years.
In contrast to these works, we identify for the first time in
the literature that strong diversity can arise because of the dif-
ferences in individuals’ belief systems; heterogeneity among
belief systems and a cascade logic structure are necessary
conditions for strong diversity. In the model, each individual
is concurrently undergoing two driver processes; individual-
level belief system dynamics to secure logical consistency of
opinions across a set of topics, and interpersonal influence
to reach a consensus. Our findings explain that when the two
drivers do not interfere with each other, a consensus is reached,
whereas conflict between the two drivers leads to persistent
disagreement even though all individuals are trying to reach
a consensus. This gives a new and illuminating perspective as
to why strong diversity can last for extended periods of time
in connected networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we provide notations, an introduction to graph theory and
the opinion dynamics model. At the same time, a formal
problem statement is given. The main results are presented
in Section III, with simulations and discussions given in
Section IV, and conclusions in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND FORMAL PROBLEM STATEMENT
We first introduce some mathematical notations used in the
paper. The (i, j)th entry of a matrix M is denoted mij . A
matrix A is said to be nonnegative (respectively positive) if
all aij are nonnegative (respectively positive). We denote A
as being nonnegative and positive by A ≥ 0 and A > 0,
respectively. A matrix A ≥ 0 is said to be row-stochastic
(respectively, row-substochastic) if there holds
∑n
j=1 aij =
1,∀i (respectively, if there holds
∑n
j=1 aij ≤ 1,∀i and ∃k :∑n
j=1 akj < 1). Let 1n and 0n denote, respectively, the n×1
column vectors of all ones and all zeros. The n × n identity
matrix is given by In. Two matrices A and B of the same
dimension are said to be of the same type, denoted by A ∼ B,
if and only if aij 6= 0 ⇔ bij 6= 0. The Kronecker product is
denoted by ⊗.
A. Graph Theory
The interaction between n individuals in a social network,
and the logical interdependence between topics, can be sep-
arately modelled using weighted directed graphs. To that
end, we introduce some notation and concepts for graphs. A
directed graph G[A] = (V, E ,A) is a triple where node vi is
in the finite, nonempty set of nodes V = {v1, . . . , vn}. The
set of ordered edges is E ⊆ V × V . We denote an ordered
edge as eij = (vi, vj) ∈ E , and because the graph is directed,
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in general the existence of eij does not imply existence of
eji. An edge eij is said to be outgoing with respect to vi and
incoming with respect to vj . Self-loops are allowed, i.e. eii
may be in E . The matrix A ∈ Rn×n associated with G[A]
captures the edge weights. More specifically, aij 6= 0 if and
only if eji ∈ E . If A is nonnegative, then all edges eij have
positive weights, while a generic A may be associated with a
signed graph G[A], having signed edge weights.
A directed path is a sequence of edges of the form
(vp1 , vp2), (vp2 , vp3), . . . where vpi ∈ V are unique, and
epipi+1 ∈ E . Node i is reachable from node j if there
exists a directed path from vj to vi. A graph is said to be
strongly connected if every node is reachable from every other
node. A square matrix A is irreducible if and only if the
associated graph G[A] is strongly connected. A directed cycle
is a directed path that starts and ends at the same node, and
contains no repeated node except the initial (which is also the
final) node. The length of a directed cycle is the number of
edges in the directed cyclic path. A directed graph is aperiodic
if there exists no integer k > 1 that divides the length of every
directed cycle of the graph [26], and any graph with a self-loop
is aperiodic.
A signed graph G is said to be structurally balanced (respec-
tively structurally unbalanced) if the nodes V = {v1, . . . vn}
can be partitioned (respectively cannot be partitioned) into two
disjoint sets such that each edge between two nodes in the
same set has a positive weight, and each edge between nodes
in different sets has a negative weight [27].
B. The Multi-Dimensional DeGroot Model
In this paper, we investigate a recently proposed multi-
dimensional extension to the DeGroot and Friedkin-Johnsen
models [18], [19], which considers the simultaneous discus-
sion of logically interdependent topics.
Formally, consider a population of n individuals discussing
simultaneously their opinions on m topics, with individual
and topic index set I = {1, . . . , n} and J = {1, . . . ,m},
respectively. Individual i’s opinions on the m topics at time




Rm. In this paper, we adopt a standard definition of an opinion
[19]. In particular, xpi (t) ∈ [−1, 1] is individual i’s attitude
towards topic p, which takes the form of a statement, with
xpi > 0 representing i’s support for statement p, x
p
i < 0
representing rejection of statement p, and xpi = 0 representing
a neutral stance. The magnitude of xpi denotes the strength
of conviction, with |xpi | = 1 being maximal support/rejection.
Mild assumptions are placed on the network and individual
parameters in the sequel to ensure that xpi (t) ∈ [−1, 1] for all
t ≥ 0, and thus the opinion values are always well defined.





where the nonnegative scalar wij represents the influence
weight individual i accords to the vector of opinions of
individual j. Thus, the influence matrix W ∈ Rn×n, with
(i, j)th entry wij , can be used to define the graph G[W ] that
describes the interpersonal influences of the n individuals. We
assume that wii > 0 and
∑n
j=1 wij = 1 for all i ∈ I, which
implies that W is row-stochastic. In some cases, information
between individuals may not be bidirectional; individual i
knows the opinions of individual j but not vice versa (e.g.
on Twitter, i may follow j but j may not follow i). Even in
the bidirectional case, the weight assigned by i to j’s opinions
may not be equal to the weight j assigns to i’s opinions. Thus,
it is not necessarily true that wij = wji, meaning W is not
necessarily symmetric and so G[W ] might be directed.
The matrix Ci ∈ Rm×m, with (p, q)th entry cpq,i, is termed
the logic matrix. In [18], [19], the authors elucidate that Ci
represents the logical interdependence between the m topics
as seen by individual i. We note that in this paper, the Ci are
assumed to be heterogeneous (i.e. ∃i, j : Ci 6= Cj). Indeed, a
critical aspect of this paper is to study how the structure of the
Cis, especially heterogeneity, can determine whether certain
topics have opinions that reach a consensus or a persistent
disagreement.
We now illustrate with a simple example how Ci is used
by individual i to obtain a set of opinions consistent with any
logical interdependencies between each topic, and in doing
so, motivate that certain constraints must be imposed on Ci
due to the problem context (these constraints are implicitly
imposed in [18], [19]). As will be evident from the following
example, logical relationships between two topics p and q are
not necessarily symmetric, so it is not necessarily true that
cpq,i = cqp,i. In fact, it is also possible that cpq,i = 0 while
cqp,i 6= 0. Thus, C is not necessarily symmetric and so G[Ci]
might be directed.
Suppose that there are two topics. Topic 1: The exploration
of Space is important to mankind’s future. Topic 2: The
exploration of Space should be privatised. Using Topic 1
as an example, and according to the definition of an opin-
ion given above Eq. (1), x1i = 1 represents individual i’s
maximal support of the importance of Space exploration,
while x1i = −1 represents maximal rejection that Space
exploration is important. Now, suppose that individual i has
xi(0) = [1,−0.2]>, i.e. individual i initially believes with
maximal conviction that Space exploration is important and
initially believes with some (but not absolute) conviction that







This tells us that individual i’s opinion on the importance of
Space exploration is unaffected by his or her own opinion on
whether Space exploration should be privatised. On the other
hand, individual i’s opinion on Topic 2 depends positively on
his or her own opinion on Topic 1, perhaps because individual
i believes privatised companies are more effective at making
breakthrough progress. In the absence of opinions from other
individuals, individual i’s opinions evolves as
xi(t+ 1) = Cixi(t), (3)
1Note that we do not require Ci to be row-stochastic and nonnegative,
though the Ci of this example is.
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which yields limt→∞ xi(t) = [1, 1]>, i.e. individual i eventu-
ally believes that Space exploration should be privatised. Thus,
xi(t) moves from xi(0) = [1,−0.2]>, where individual i’s
opinions are inconsistent with the logical interdependence as
captured by Ci, to the final state xi(∞) = [1, 1]>, which is
consistent with the logical interdependence. Eq. (3), with opin-
ion vector xi(t) and the logical interdependencies captured
by Ci, models individual i’s belief system. (We explained
qualitatively what a belief system was in the Introduction, and
have now given the mathematical formulation.)
In general, one might expect, as do we in this paper, that an
individual’s belief system without interpersonal influence from
neighbours will eventually become consistent. For a topic p
which is independent of all other topics, one also expects that
xpi (t + 1) = x
p
i (t) for all t. To ensure the belief system is
eventually consistent, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1. For all i ∈ I, the matrix Ci with (p, q)th
entry cpq,i, is such that each eigenvalue of Ci is either 1 or
has modulus less than 1. If an eigenvalue of Ci is 1, then
it is semi-simple2. For all i ∈ I and p ∈ J , there holds∑m
q=1 |cpq,i| = 1, and the diagonal entries satisfy cpp,i > 0.
The assumptions on the eigenvalues of Ci are necessary
and sufficient [26, Lemma 1.7] for Eq. (3) to converge to a
limit, i.e. for individual i’s belief system to eventually become
consistent. The other assumptions lead to desirable properties
for the system Eq. (1). Specifically, the reasonable assumption
that cpp,i > 0 means topic p is positively correlated with itself.
The constraint
∑m
q=1 |cpq,i| = 1 for all i ∈ I and p ∈ J
ensures that if xpi (0) ∈ [−1, 1] for all i ∈ I and p ∈ J , then
it is guaranteed that xpi (t) ∈ [−1, 1] for all t ≥ 0 (this is
proved in [18]). From this constraint, we also observe that if
topic p is independent of all other topics, i.e. cpq,i = 0 for all
q 6= p, then cpp,i = 1. The well-studied special case where
topics are totally independent is Ci = Im. We are now in a
position to formally define this paper’s objective.
C. Objective Statement
This paper is focused on establishing the effects of the set of
logic matrices Ci, i ∈ I on the evolution of opinions, and in
particular the limiting opinion configuration. First, we record
two assumptions on the logic matrix and the network topology,
which will hold throughout this paper, and then explain the
motivation for these assumptions.
Assumption 2. For every i, j ∈ I, there holds Ci ∼ Cj .
Assumption 3. The influence network G[W ] is strongly con-
nected, W is row-stochastic, and wii > 0,∀i ∈ I.
Assumption 2 implies that, for every i, j ∈ I, the graphs
G[Ci] and G[Cj ] have the same structure (but possibly with
different edge weights, including weights of opposing signs).
This means that all individuals have the same view on which
topics have dependent relationships with which other topics,
but the assigned weights cij (and signs) may be different. This
2By semi-simple, we mean that the geometric and algebraic multiplicities
are the same. Equivalently, all Jordan blocks of the eigenvalue 1 are 1 by 1.
assumption ensures that the scope of this paper is reasonable,
because if Ci ∼ Cj does not hold, the problem complexity
explodes due to the large number of different scenarios one
needs to analyse.
Assumption 3 is not necessary to establish convergence
of Eq. (1). Rather, we deliberately impose Assumption 3 in
order to draw an important contrast with existing work. This
is because if G[W ] is strongly connected and Ci = Cj =
C,∀ i, j ∈ I (homogeneous), the opinions in each topic will
reach a consensus. By establishing that disagreement can arise
under Assumption 3 (as we will show in Section III), we
directly prove that disagreement is due to heterogeneity in Ci,
i.e. heterogeneity in individuals’ belief systems. We provide
further details and discussions of this particular aspect in
Section IV-C.
Objective 1. Let a set of logic matrices Ci, i ∈ I and an
influence network G[W ] be given, satisfying Assumptions 1, 2
and 3. Suppose that each individual i’s opinion vector xi(t) ∈
[−1, 1]m evolves according to Eq. (1). Then, for each k ∈ J
and generic initial conditions x(0) ∈ [−1, 1]nm, this paper
will investigate a method to systematically determine when




xki (t) = αk, ∀i ∈ I. (4)
We will show with the main theoretical results in Section III
that Ci of a certain structure always guarantees consensus (i.e.
Eq. (4) is satisfied), and conversely, that Ci of a certain other
structure will lead to disagreement in certain identifiable topics
(i.e. Eq. (4) is not satisfied). This will help achieve the above
objective. Then, in Section IV we will compare our findings
with the existing results to illustrate the unique phenomena that
can arise when introducing heterogeneity into the Ci matrix,
and the novel explanation of disagreement we obtain.
To conclude this subsection, we now provide the definition
of “competing logical interdependencies” which will be impor-
tant in some scenarios for characterising the final opinions.
Definition 1 (Competing Logical Interdependence). An influ-
ence network is said to contain individuals with competing
logical interdependencies on topic p ∈ J if there exist
individuals i, j such that for some q ∈ J \ {p}, Ci and Cj
have nonzero entries cpq,i and cpq,j that are of opposite signs.
In other words, individuals with competing logical interde-
pendencies are those who, when having the same opinion on
topic q, move in opposite directions on the opinion spectrum
for topic p. Using the example in Section II-B, one might have







because j considers that private companies are profit-driven,
and therefore cannot be ethically trusted with the exploration
of Space. Then, from Eq. (3), one has that xj(∞) = [1,−1]>,
i.e. individual j eventually firmly believes Space exploration
should not be privatised. In particular, x1j (∞) = −x2j (∞).
In light of Assumption 2, if two individuals have competing
interdependencies on topic p, then for every individual i ∈ I,
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there is necessarily some individual k ∈ I \ {i} with whom
individual i has competing logical interdependence on topic
p: the nonzero entries cpq,i and cpq,k are of opposite signs for
some q ∈ J .
Remark 1. Recall that Ci is individual i’s set of con-
straints/functional dependencies between topics in i’s belief
system. Thus, heterogeneity of Ci may arise for many different
reasons, such as education, background, or expertise in the
topic. For example, if the set of topics is related to sports, a
professional athlete may have very different weights (including
the signs) in Ci compared to someone that does not pursue an
active lifestyle. Interestingly, [28] showed that when presented
with the same published statement on an issue, different people
could take opposite positions on the issue.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main results are presented in two parts. First, we es-
tablish a general convergence result for the networked system.
Then, we analyse the limiting opinion distribution and the role
of the set of logic matrices in determining whether opinions
for a given topic will reach consensus or fail to do so. In order
to focus on the theoretical results and interpretations as social
phenomena, all proofs are presented in the Appendix.
A. Convergence
Denoting the vector of opinions for the entire influence
network as x = [x1(t)>, . . . ,xn(t)>]> ∈ Rnm, the network
dynamics of Eq. (1) are given by
x(t+ 1) =
w11C1 · · · w1nC1... . . . ...
wn1Cn · · · wnnCn
x(t), (6)
and we define the system matrix above as B ∈ Rnm×nm. To
begin, we rewrite the network dynamics Eq. (6) into a different
form to aid analysis by introducing a reordering.
For all k ∈ J , define yk(t) = [y1k(t), . . . ynk (t)]> =
[xk1(t), . . . , x
k
n(t)]
>. In other words, for given i ∈ I and k ∈
J , yik represents individual i’s opinion on topic k. The reader
is also referred to Fig. 1 for an example of the reordering.
Then, yk(t) ∈ Rn is the vector of all n individuals’ opinions
on the kth topic at time t, and we say that the opinions on
topic k are at a consensus if yk = α1n for some scalar α. For
all k, j ∈ J , we define Γkj = diag(ckj,1, . . . , ckj,n) ∈ Rn×n
as the diagonal matrix with the ith diagonal element being





Defining y(t) = [y1(t)
>, . . . ,ym(t)
>]> ∈ Rnm, we further
obtain
y(t+ 1) =
Γ11W · · · Γ1mW... . . . ...
Γm1W · · · ΓmmW
y(t). (8)
We denote the matrix in Eq. (8) as A ∈ Rnm×nm, with block






















Figure 1. An illustrative network with 2 individuals discussing 3 topics, with
only selected edges drawn for clarity. Each node represents the opinion of
an individual for a topic, with red and blue nodes associated with individuals
1 and 2, respectively. The black edges represent interpersonal influence via
the weight wij , while the coloured edges represent logical interdependencies
between topics. In G[B], nodes are grouped and ordered by individual in
node subset Ṽq (as illustrated by the dotted green ellipse groupings) leading
to Eq. (6). In G[A], the nodes are grouped and ordered by topic in node
subset Vp (as illustrated by the dotted green ellipses) leading to Eq. (8).
the system Eq. (8) can be considered as a consensus process
on a multiplex (or multi-layered) signed graph.
Consider the matrix A in Eq. (8), with the associated graph
G[A], and the matrix B in Eq. (6), with associated graph
G[B]. Clearly, the two graphs are the same up to a reordering
of the nodes. In G[A], with node set V[A] = {v1, . . . , vnm},
one can consider the node subset Vp = {v(p−1)n+1, . . . , vpn},
p ∈ J as a layer of the multi-layer graph G[A] with vertices
associated with the opinions of individuals 1, . . . , n on topic
p. In G[B], with node set V[B] = {v1, . . . , vnm}, one can
consider the node subset Ṽq = {v(q−1)m+1, . . . , vqm}, q ∈ I
as a layer of a multi-layer graph with vertices associated
with the opinions of individual q on topics 1, . . . ,m. This
is illustrated in Fig. 1, where each layer is identified by
a dotted green ellipse border. A key motivation to study
G[A] and the dynamical system Eq. (8) is that all the block
diagonal entries Aii of A are nonnegative and irreducible
because Assumption 1 indicates that Γpp is a positive diagonal
matrix. This means that the edges between nodes in the subset
Vp = {v(p−1)n+1, . . . , vpn}, p ∈ J have positive weights, a
property which greatly aids in the checking of the structural
balance or unbalance of G[A] given G[W ] and Ci,∀ i ∈ I.
Verify from the row-stochastic property of W and the row-
sum property of Ci in Assumption 1 that the entries of A
satisfy
∑nm
q=1 |apq| = 1 for all p = 1, . . . , nm. One can
conclude that Eq. (8) has the same dynamics as the discrete-
time Altafini model (see e.g. [9], [10]).
Remark 2. Although Eq. (8) has the same dynamics as the
discrete-time Altafini model, a number of important differences
exist. First, the context of negative edge weights is entirely
different: in the Altafini model, wij < 0 implies individual
i mistrusts individual j [9]. In contrast, Eq. (8) assumes
nonnegative influence wij ≥ 0, and the negative edge weights
arise from negative logical interdependencies in Ci. Moreover
the network structure of G[A] is affected by both the influence
network G[W ] and the logic matrix graphs G[Ci].
The main convergence result is given as follows.
Theorem 1. Suppose that for a population of n individu-
als, the vector of the n individuals’ opinions y(t) evolves
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according to Eq. (8), with interpersonal influences captured
by G[W ]. Suppose further that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
Then, for any initial condition y(0) ∈ [−1, 1]nm, there exists
some y∗ ∈ [−1, 1]nm such that there holds limt→∞ y(t) = y∗
exponentially fast.
We remark that for arbitrary initial conditions y(0) ∈ Rnm
one can still prove that limt→∞ y(t) = y∗ for some y∗.
However, y∗ ∈ [−1, 1]nm is no longer guaranteed, and thus
to keep consistent with the rest of the paper, the statement
in Theorem 1 assumes y(0) ∈ [−1, 1]nm. Having established
that the opinion dynamical system always converges, we turn
to addressing Objective 1 by studying the influence of Ci in
determining the limiting opinion vector y∗.
B. Consensus and Disagreement of Each Topic
We now explain how to use the logic matrices Ci to
systematically determine whether opinions on a given topic
p ∈ J will reach a consensus or not. In Section IV, we
present simulations and discussions to illustrate how to use
our results, and to highlight interesting social interpretations
of the theoretical results.
Consider the graph G[Ci] associated with Ci for some
i ∈ I, which is a signed graph if there are negative off-
diagonal entries in Ci. Under Assumption 2, irreducibility
of one Ci implies the same for all, and in the absence of
competing logical interdependencies, the structural balance or
unbalance of one G[Ci] implies the same for all. Irreducible
logic matrices correspond to strongly connected G[Ci], mean-
ing all topics are directly or indirectly dependent on all other
topics. We now present a theorem establishing that if Ci for
all i ∈ I are irreducible, then all topics will reach a consensus
(although the consensus value for two different topics p and
q may be different).
Theorem 2. Let the hypotheses in Theorem 1 hold. Suppose
that y(0) ∈ [−1, 1]nm and Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
Suppose further that Ci,∀ i ∈ I are irreducible. Then, for all
k ∈ J , limt→∞ yk(t) = αk1n exponentially fast, for some
αk ∈ [−1, 1]. Moreover,
1) If there are no competing logical interdependencies, as
given in Definition 1, and G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are structurally
balanced, then for almost all initial conditions, |αp| =
|αq| 6= 0,∀ p, q ∈ J .
2) If either (i) G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are structurally unbalanced, or
(ii) there are competing logical interdependencies, then
αk = 0,∀ k ∈ J .
Further to the conclusions of Theorem 2, one can obtain
the following result for the case where consensus to a nonzero
opinion value is achieved.
Corollary 1. Let the hypotheses in Theorem 2 hold. Suppose
that there are no competing logical interdependencies, and
G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are structurally balanced. For G[Ci] with node
set V = {v1, . . . , vm}, define two disjoint subsets of nodes
V[Ci]+ and V[Ci]− so that each edge between two nodes in
V[Ci]+ or two nodes in V[Ci]− has a positive weight, and
each edge between two nodes in V[Ci]+ and V[Ci]− has a









Figure 2. An illustrative example of G[Ci], with each node representing a
topic, and edges representing logical interdependencies between topics (self-
loops are hidden for clarity). One can divide the nodes into strongly connected
components (each dotted coloured circle denotes a strongly connected com-
ponent). The results of this paper allow one to progressively analyse each
component to establish which topics will have opinions reaching a consensus
and which topics will have opinions reaching a persistent disagreement.
1) αp = αq if vq, vp ∈ V[Ci]+ or vq, vp ∈ V[Ci]−.
2) αp = −αq if vq ∈ V[Ci]+ and vp ∈ V[Ci]−.
Consider now the more general case where Ci ∀ i ∈ I is
reducible, i.e. G[Ci] is no longer strongly connected. From
a graphical perspective, the graph G[Ci] can be divided into
strongly connected components which are “closed” or “open”.
(This is related to a concept called the condensation of a graph,
see [26]). Formally, we say that a subgraph Ḡ is a strongly
connected component of G if Ḡ is strongly connected and
any other subgraph of G strictly containing Ḡ is not strongly
connected. A strongly connected component Ḡ of a graph
G is said to be closed if there are no incoming edges to Ḡ
from a node outside of Ḡ, and is said to be open otherwise.
The smallest strongly connected component is a single node,
and it would be closed if there are no incoming edges to it.
Figure 2 shows an example of a graph G[Ci] divided into
strongly connected components (identified by the encircling
dotted lines), with the blue and purple components being
closed, and the green and orange components being open.
From an algebraic perspective. Assumption 2 indicates that
there exists a common permutation matrix P such that, for
all i ∈ I, P TCiP is lower block triangular (equivalent to a
reordering of the nodes of G[Ci]). Without loss of generality,
we therefore assume that the topics p ∈ J are ordered such
that, for each i ∈ I,
Ci =

C11,i 0 · · · 0





Cs1,i Cs2,i · · · Css,i
 , (9)
where Cjj,i ∈ Rsj×sj is irreducible for any j ∈ S ,
{1, 2, · · · , s} and sj are positive integers such that
∑s
j=1 sj =
m. Each G[Cjj,i] corresponds to a strongly connected com-
ponent, and there are s components in total, with the jth
component having sj nodes (topics). Decompose the opinion







si−1 + 2, . . . ,
j∑
i=1
si−1 + sj}, (10)
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with s0 = 0. To clarify, we now use the example in Fig. 2 to
illustrate the notation in Eq. (9) and Eq. (10). First, S indexes
the strongly connected components of G[Ci]: in Fig. 2, one
has S = {blue , 1, purple , 2, green , 3, orange , 4}.
Thus, there are s = 4 strongly connected components, and the
number of nodes in the jth component is sj : we get s1 =
3, s2 = 1, s3 = 2, s4 = 1. Since Jj indexes the topics in
the jth component, one has J1 = {1, 2, 3}, J2 = {4}, J3 =
{5, 6}, J4 = {7}.
Though reducible Ci may seem to be restrictive, they are
in fact common given the problem context since they imply
a cascade logical interdependence structure among the topics.
This may be representative of an individual i who obtains Ci
by sequentially building upon an axiom or axioms (the first
Cjj,i block matrices corresponding to closed strongly con-
nected components). The two topics of the Space exploration
example given in Eq. (2) constitute one such example of a
belief system driven by an axiom (Topic 1).
If the topic set Jj corresponds to a closed strongly con-
nected component of G[Ci], then clearly in Eq. (9), Cpj,i = 0
for all p 6= j (e.g. the blue and purple components in Fig. 2).
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 establish that for every k ∈ Jj ,
there holds limt→∞ yk(t) = αk1n exponentially fast, with
αk ∈ [−1, 1]. That is, all opinions in topic k ∈ Jj reach a
consensus. If, on the other hand, the topic set Jj corresponds
to an open strongly connected component of G[Ci] (green
and orange components in Fig. 2), then the results we present
below can be employed sequentially in order to establish
whether opinions on a given topic have reached a consensus.
By “sequentially”, we mean that we analyse the topic sets Jj
with j in the order 1, 2, . . . , s. Under Assumption 2, define
for each topic p ∈ J , the set
Ĵp , {q ∈ J : cpq,i 6= 0, q 6= p} (11)
where cpq,i is the pqth entry of Ci. In other words, Ĵp
identifies all topics q ∈ J that topic p is logically dependent
upon. Because of Assumption 2, the set Ĵp is the same for all
individuals i ∈ I. For example, in Fig. 2, Ĵ6 = {4, 5} because
Topic 6 depends on Topics 4 and 5.
Considering a Jj corresponding to an open strongly con-
nected component of G[Ci], one can derive from Eq. (8) and













For further details, including the existence of (In−ΓppW )−1,
see the Appendix. To more precisely characterise y∗p in
Eq. (12) and to help answer Objective 1, we now present two
theorems for necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure
every topic in the subset Jj reaches a consensus of opinions.
The first theorem considers the case when the subset Jj is a
singleton (e.g. J4 = {7} in Fig. 2), and the second the case
when Jj has at least two elements (e.g. J3 = {5, 6} in Fig. 2).
Theorem 3. Let the hypotheses in Theorem 1 hold. Assume
that y(0) ∈ [−1, 1]nm and Ci,∀ i ∈ I is decomposed as in
Eq. (9). Suppose that Jj = {p}, as defined in Eq. (10), is
a singleton, and let Ĵp as defined in Eq. (11) be nonempty.
Suppose further that all topics q ∈ Ĵp satisfy limt→∞ yq =
αq1n, αq ∈ [−1, 1]. Then, limt→∞ yp(t) = αp1n for some
αp ∈ [−1, 1] if and only if ∃κp ∈ [−1, 1] such that




holds. If such a κp exists, then αp = κp.
The key necessary and sufficient condition of Eq. (13) is
somewhat complex and nonintuitive. Roughly speaking, Theo-
rem 3 states that if there exists κp ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (13)
then Topic p will reach a consensus value of αp = κp. If such
a κp does not exist, then Topic p will not reach a consensus.
Since Γpp is a positive diagonal matrix with diagonal entries
less than 1, it is obvious that In−Γpp is invertible, and any κ
satisfying Eq. (13) must be unique. Example 1 in Section IV-A
details separate simulation examples in which ∃κp ∈ [−1, 1],
and @κp ∈ [−1, 1], satisfying Eq. (13). The following corollary
studies Eq. (13) for some situations which are important or of
interest in the social context, with Items 1) and 4) illustrated
in Section IV-A, Example 1.
Corollary 2. Adopting the hypotheses in Theorem 3, the
following hold:
1) Suppose that Ĵp = {q} is a singleton. Then, ∃κp ∈
[−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (13) if and only if there do not
exist individuals i, j ∈ I with competing logical interde-
pendencies on topic p.
2) If αq = 0 for all q ∈ Ĵp, then κp = 0 satisfies Eq. (13).
3) Suppose that Ĵp = {q1, . . . , qr}, r ≥ 2. If cpqk,i =
cpqk,j = cpqk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , r} and i, j ∈ I, then
there exists a κp ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (13).
4) Suppose that Ĵp = {q1, . . . , qr}, r ≥ 2. Suppose further
that |αqu | = |αqv | for all u, v ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Then, there
exists a κp ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (13) if either (i) the
sign of cpqk,i and αqk are equal for all i ∈ I and k ∈
{1, . . . , r} or (ii) the sign of cpqk,i and αqk are opposite
for all i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, . . . , r}. In the case of (i),
κp = |αqk |, and in the case of (ii), κp = −|αqk |.
When Jj is not a singleton, the analysis becomes signif-
icantly more involved. To that end, we first introduce some
additional notation. Define
J̃j , ∪k∈Jj Ĵk \ Jj (14)
as the set of topics not in Jj that the topics in Jj depend
upon. For example, in Fig. 2, J3 = {5, 6} (the third strongly
connected component consists of Topics 5 and 6), while Ĵ5 =
{3, 6} (Topic 5 depends on Topics 3 and 6) and Ĵ6 = {4, 5}
(Topic 6 depends on Topics 4 and 5). Thus, J̃3 = {3, 4}
because outside of the strongly connected component formed
by Topics 5 and 6, Topics 5 and 6 together depend also on
Topics 3 and 4. Note that if Jj = {p} is a singleton, we have
J̃j = Ĵp. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Theorem 3 requires that
consensus must first occur for topics in J̃j = Ĵp, on which
the topics in Jj depend. The following theorem also has the
requirement that consensus occur for all topics in J̃j .
Theorem 4. Let the hypotheses in Theorem 1 hold. Assume
that y(0) ∈ [−1, 1]nm, and Ci,∀ i ∈ I is decomposed as in
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Eq. (9). Suppose that Jj = {j1, . . . , jz}, has z ≥ 2 elements.
Let J̃j , as defined in Eq. (14), be nonempty and suppose
further that all topics q ∈ J̃j satisfy y∗q = αq1n, αq ∈ [−1, 1].
Then, limt→∞ yk = αk1n for all k ∈ Jj if and only if there
exists a vector φ = [φ1, . . . , φz]>, with φk ∈ [−1, 1]∀k =
1, . . . , z, such that
(
Inz −
Γj1j1 . . . Γj1jz... . . . ...











holds. If such a vector φ exists, then αk = φk for all k ∈ Jj .
In Section IV-A, Example 2, we give a working example for
how one may obtain φ. Roughly speaking, Theorem 4 states
that all topics j1, . . . , jz of the set Jj will reach a consensus
if there exists a φ, with each entry having modulus equal to 1
or less, satisfying Eq. (15). If such a φ does not exist, then all
topics in Jj will fail to reach a consensus. The matrix on the
left of Eq. (15) is invertible (see Appendix G), which implies
that if φ exists satisfying Eq. (15), then it is unique. Similar
to above, we now present a corollary which gives sufficient
conditions for Eq. (15) in two scenarios.
Corollary 3. Adopting the hypotheses in Theorem 4, the
following hold:
1) If αq = 0 for all q ∈ J̃j , then φ = 0z satisfies Eq. (15).
2) If ckp,i = ckp,h for all k ∈ Jj , p ∈ J and i, h ∈ I, then
there exists a φ satisfying Eq. (15).
For any given set of logic matrices Ci and strongly
connected social network G[W ], Theorems 2, 3, 4 together
establish comprehensive necessary and sufficient conditions
enabling us to determine whether a consensus of opinions
is reached for every topic k ∈ J . Since the theorems also
detail necessary conditions, we are also able to establish when
disagreement arises, because if the opinions for a given topic
are not at a consensus, then by definition the opinions are
at a disagreement. Objective 1 has been achieved. For the
illustrative example in Fig. 2, one would first analyse the blue
and purple components using Theorem 2. Then, one would
analyse the green component using Theorem 4, and last the
orange component using Theorem 3.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In Section IV-A we use several simulation examples to
illustrate select key conclusions of Section III, and then
provide social interpretations of our results in Section IV-B.
Section IV-C provides a comparison and discussion of our
findings relative to other existing works in the literature.
A. Simulation Examples
We now provide several simulations to illustrate some of
the results in Section III using a network G[W ] of n = 6
individuals, with a W which satisfies Assumption 3 (the
numerical values of W can be found in the arXiv version
this paper [29]). Initial conditions are generated by selecting
each xpi (0) from a uniform distribution in [−1, 1], and for
each simulation example, the same initial conditon vector x(0)
is used. This is to isolate and highlight the role of the Ci
matrix. As will be apparent below, certain entries of Ci will
be drawn from random uniform distributions, and in all such
cases, normalisation of the entries is conducted to ensure the
row sum constraint in Assumption 1 holds. The examples will
help to explain the two key conditions Eq. (13) and Eq. (15)
in Theorems 3 and 4, respectively, while also illustrating
that certain qualitative phenomena, viz. reaching consensus
or disagreement, do not depend on the precise values of the
entries of Ci.
Example 1: We illustrate Theorem 3 and Eq. (13) with an
example of 3 topics, i.e. J = {1, 2, 3}. For all i = 1, . . . , 6,
the logic matrix is
Ci =
 1 0 0−βi 1− βi 0
δi −ηi 1− (δi + ηi)
 (16)
where βi, δi, and ηi are drawn from a uniform distribution
in the interval (0, 1). Then, δi and ηi are appropriately nor-
malised. Notice that there are no competing logical interde-
pendencies associated with the set of Ci, and according to the
notation of Eq. (10), we have J1 = {1} (closed), J2 = {2}
(open), and J3 = {3} (open). The temporal evolution of x(t)
is given in Fig. 3, with each line denoting an individual’s
opinion, and different colours denoting different topics.
Consistent with Theorem 2, Topic 1 reaches a consensus,
with a specific value in this example of α1 = −0.3484.
Consider now Topic 2, for which Theorem 3 is the relevant
result. Here, p = 2, and Ĵp = 1 (Topic 2 depends on Topic
1). Because c21,i is negative and 1 − c22,i = |c21,i| for all i,
we have In − Γ22 = −Γ21. Obviously, κ2 = 0.3484 = −α1
satisfies Eq. (13), and Theorem 3 then establishes that Topic 2
will reach a consensus value of α2 = κ2 (one can also see that
Corollary 2 Item 1) applies). One can see this indeed reflected
in Fig. 3. Next, we consider Topic 3, with again Theorem 3
being relevant. Now, p = 3 and Ĵp = {1, 2} (Topic 3 depends
on Topics 1 and 2). Notice that sign(c31,i) = −sign(α1)
and sign(c32,i) = −sign(α2) for all i. Moreover, recall that
1 − c33,i = |c31,i| + |c32,i| for all i. One can verify that
for p = 3, κ3 = −0.3484 satisfies Eq. (13), from which
Theorem 3 establishes that Topic 2 will reach a consensus
value of α3 = κ3 (see also Corollary 2 Item 4). This can be
observed in Fig. 3. It is important to stress that although α1
depends on x(0), the Ci in Eq. (16) have entries with certain
sign patterns which ensure the existence of κ2, κ3 ∈ [−1, 1]
satisfying Eq. (13), for all α1 ∈ [−1, 1]. That is, the consensus
of Topics 2 and 3 are robust to initial condition values x(0)
and separately to the entries of Ci having values randomly
drawn from a uniform distribution.
To illustrate the impact of competing logical interdependen-
cies, we make a single and simple change to the simulation
setup. Specifically, for i = 1, we introduce competing logical
interdependencies in Topic 2 by changing the c21,1 entry of
C1 from −β1 to β1 (from negative to positive weight). The
temporal evolution of the opinions is given in Fig. 4. With this
adjustment, for Topic 2, there does not exist a κ2 satisfying
9










Figure 3. Evolution of opinions for 3 topics, with Ci given in Eq. (16).










Figure 4. Evolution of opinions for 3 topics, with Ci given in Eq. (16),
except C1 has entry c21,1 = β1.
Eq. (13), and Theorem 3 predicts that the final opinions of
Topic 2 will be at a disagreement. This is also established in
Corollary 2, Item 1), and is clearly observed in Fig. 4. Because
Topic 3 is dependent on Topic 2, one observes in Fig. 4 that
Topic 3 also fails to reach a consensus (see the conjecture in
Remark 3 in Section IV-B below).
Example 2: Now, we illustrate Theorem 4 and Eq. (15) with
an example of 3 topics, i.e. J = {1, 2, 3}. For all i = 1, . . . , 6,
the logic matrix is
Ci =
 1 0 0θβi 1− (1 + θ)βi −βi
τδi −δi 1− δi(1 + τ)
 , (17)
where θ, τ are positive scalars and βi and δi are randomly
drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval (0, 1), and
appropriately normalised. In our particular example, we choose
θ = 0.5 and τ = 0.3. According to the notation of Eq. (10),
we have J1 = {1} (closed), J2 = {2, 3} (open), and the
temporal evolution of x(t) is given in Fig. 5.
Consistent with Theorem 2, Topic 1 reaches a consensus,
with a value in this example of α1 = 0.655. We consider the
open strongly connected component comprising of Topics 2
and 3, for which Theorem 4 is applicable. Following Theo-
rem 4’s notation, j = 2, so that J2 = {2, 3} and J̃2 = {1}.
Define β and ∆ to be n×n diagonal matrices with ith entry
being βi and δi, respectively. Eq. (15) evaluates to be[
(1 + θ)β β























Figure 5. Evolution of opinions for 3 topics, with Ci given in Eq. (17).










Figure 6. Evolution of opinions for 3 topics, with Ci given in Eq. (19).
Substituting in α1 = 0.655, θ = 0.5 and τ = 0.2, one can
verify that Eq. (18) holds for φ2 = 0.3275 and φ3 = −0.1637.
Theorem 4 predicts that Topics 2 and 3 will reach a consensus,
with values φ2 and φ3, respectively. Indeed, this is observed
in Fig. 5. It is important to note that although α1 depends on
x(0), there exists a φ satisfying Eq. (15) for all α1 ∈ [−1, 1].
In other words, the consensus of Topics 2 and 3 are robust
to variations in x(0), and also robust to values of parameters
θ, τ (with appropriate normalisation).
The entries of Ci in Eq. (17) have a specific relationship:
c21,i and c31,i are scalar multiples of c23,i and c32,i, respec-
tively, with the scalars independent of i. Suppose the scalar
relationships did not hold, and instead the logic matrix was
Ci =
 1 0 0ηi 1− (βi + ηi) −βi
µi −δi 1− (δi + µi)
 , (19)
where ηi, βi, µi, δi are independently randomly drawn from
a uniform distribution in the interval (0, 1) with appropriate
normalisation. Generically, there will not exist φ satisfying
Eq. (15), and so a consensus will not be reached; an example
simulation is presented in Fig. 6. From numerous simulations,
we observed that Eq. (15) is generally much harder to satisfy
than Eq. (13), indicating open strongly connected components
of two or more topics are less likely to reach a consensus.
B. Discussion and Social Interpretations
We now provide some discussion and comments on the main
results, focusing in particular on the theorems and corollaries
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in Section III-B. Overall, the outcomes we have established
depend on the graphical structures G[Ci] on the one hand,
and on the numerical values (including their signs) of the Ci
entries on the other.
This dependence sometimes flows simply from the signs
(the presence or absence of competing logical interdependen-
cies), such as Example 1 in Section IV-A. At other times,
the precise values of the Ci matter, as illustrated in Example
2 of Section IV-A (compare Eq. (17) and Eq. (19)). Further,
when consensus on a topic occurs, it is evident that sometimes
a value 0 is always the outcome, and sometimes a nonzero
value dependent on the initial opinions of topics in the
closed strongly connected components of G[Ci]. Moreover,
the consensus point for each topic can differ in both sign and
absolute value, as in Example 2 of Section IV-A, Fig. 5.
One interpretation of a topic set Jj corresponding to a
closed strongly connected component of G[Ci] is that the
topic(s) is an axiom(s) upon which an individual builds his
or her belief system (see below Eq. (10)). Theorem 2 indi-
cates that discussion of axiomatic topics will always lead a
consensus under the model Eq. (1).
Theorem 2 and Corollaries 2 and 3 also illustrate that
competing logical interdependencies, if present, can play a
major role in determining the final opinion values. For a
topic set Jj corresponding to a closed and strongly connected
component of G[Ci], all opinion values for all topics in
Jj converge to the neutral value at 0 whenever competing
interdependencies are present in Jj (Theorem 2, Item 2)). For
an open strongly connected component Jj , the presence of any
competing logical interdependencies in topic p ∈ Jj is enough
to prevent the sufficient conditions detailed in Corollary 2 Item
1), 3), and 4) and Corollary 3 Item 2) from being satisfied. Of
particular note is Corollary 2 Item 1). As illustrated in Example
1 in Section IV-A, heterogeneity with respect to i in the entries
of c21,i is not enough to prevent a consensus of opinions
on Topic 2; competing logical interdependences are required.
The necessity of the competing logical interdependencies for
disagreement is a surprising, and non-intuitive result.
It is also clear from Theorems 2, 3 and 4 that disagreement
is possible only in topic sets Jj associated with an open
strongly connected component of G[Ci]. Put another way,
belief systems with a cascade logical structure, viz. reducible
Ci in the form of Eq. (9), including heterogeneity among
individuals’ belief systems, may play a significant role in gen-
erating disagreement when social networks discuss multiple
logically interdependent topics. Looking at Eq. (1), one can
see two separate processes occurring: the DeGroot component
describes interpersonal influence between individuals in an
effort to reach a consensus, while the logic matrix by itself
(as in Eq. (3)) captures an intrapersonal effort to secure
logical consistency of opinions across several topics. These
two drivers may or may not end up in conflict, and the presence
of conflict or lack thereof determines whether opinions of a
certain topic reach a consensus or fail to do so. Our results in
Theorems 3 and 4 identify when such conflict can occur.
Remark 3. Theorems 3 and 4 establish necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for topic jk ∈ Jj = {j1, . . . , jz} to reach
a consensus under a particular hypothesis. Specifically, it is
assumed that for the set Jj under consideration, there holds
y∗q = αq1n , ∀ q ∈ J̃j . (20)
That is, all other topics that one or more topics jk ∈ Jj de-
pend upon are assumed to have reached a consensus. Based on
numerous simulations, we believe the requirement that Eq. (20)
holds is also a necessary condition for yjk , jk ∈ Jj to reach
a consensus. In other words, if any topic q ∈ J̃j fails to reach
a consensus, we conjecture that all yjk , k = 1, . . . , z will also
fail to reach a consensus. Confirming this would provide yet
another indication that networks with belief systems having a
cascade logic structure more readily result in disagreement.
We leave this to future investigations.
C. Novel Insight Into Strong Diversity
We now compare our findings with those in the existing
literature. The dynamics Eq. (1) is a particular variation on the
model studied in [18], [19], and we explain why our findings
are especially illuminating.
For any W satisfying Assumption 3, it is known that
limk→∞W
k = 1nγ
> where γ> is a left eigenvector of
W associated with the simple eigenvalue at 1, having entries
γj > 0, and normalised to satisfy γ>1n = 1 [26]. Suppos-
ing that the logic matrices were indeed homogeneous, i.e.
Ci = Cj = C for all i, j ∈ I, we can verify that much
of the analysis becomes easier. For then Eq. (6) becomes
x(t + 1) = (W ⊗ C)x(t), and the limiting behaviour is
characterised by the following result (which is a restatement
of [18, Theorem 3]).
Theorem 5. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Suppose
further that Ci = Cj = C for all i, j ∈ I. Then, the system




where γj > 0 is detailed immediately above.
Theorem 5 enables us to compare the results between
Theorems 2, 3, and 4 of this paper with the case in [18] where
C is homogeneous (under the same Assumptions 1, 2, and 3).
Theorem 5 shows that if C is homogeneous, then the opinions
of all individuals on any given topic reach a consensus: Eq. (4)
is satisfied for all k ∈ J .
The Friedkin–Johnsen variant to Eq. (1) is also studied in
[18], [19], and is given as
xi(t+ 1) = λi
n∑
j=1
wijCixj(t) + (1− λi)xi(0). (21)
Here, the parameter λi ∈ [0, 1] represents individual i’s
susceptibility to interpersonal influence, while 1−λi represents
the level of stubborn attachment3 by individual i to his/her
initial opinions xi(0). This paper studies the special case
where λi = 1, ∀ i ∈ I, and thus Eq. (21) and Eq. (1) are
equivalent. When W satisfies Assumption 3 and ∃i, j ∈ I
with i 6= j such that λi, λj < 1, a strong diversity of opinions
3The paper [19] secures a convergence result for heterogeneous Ci but
makes an assumption that there is at least one individual i with λi < 1. [18]
assumes homogeneous C.
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emerges if xi(0) 6= xj(0) as a consequence of individuals i
and j having some level of attachment to their initial opinions
xi(0),xj(0), even if Ci = Im for all i ∈ I [18], [19].
In contrast, this paper has assumed heterogeneous Ci and
λi = 0 for all i, and shown that opinions on a given topic
can fail to reach a consensus with instead strong diversity
emerging. Specifically, Theorem 2 shows that when the Ci
are irreducible, a consensus is achieved for each topic, and
is thus consistent with the results observed in [18]. However,
different phenomena are generated when Ci are reducible,
viz. consensus of each topic for homogeneous C (as in
[18]) and disagreement for heterogeneous Ci (Theorems 3
and 4). Consequently, we have isolated and highlighted the
separate roles of both the structure and the heterogeneity of
the Ci among individuals, in creating strong diversity. In
fact, a cascade logic structure is necessary for disagreement.
This constitutes a novel insight into the emergence of strong
diversity in strongly connected networks, linking it for the first
time to differences in individuals’ belief systems as opposed
to stubbornness [13], a desire to be unique [23], [24], or social
distancing [23].
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied influence networks in which individuals
discuss a set of logically interdependent topics, assuming
that the network has no stubborn individuals in order to
focus on the effects of the logical interdependence structure.
We established that for strongly connected networks, and
reasonable assumptions on the logic matrix, the opinions
converge exponentially fast to some steady-state value. We
then provided a systematic way to help determine whether a
given topic will reach a consensus or fail to do so. It was dis-
covered that heterogeneity of reducible logic matrices among
individuals, including differences in signs of the off-diagonal
entries, played a primary role in producing disagreement in
the final opinion values. In the problem context, we have
established that a cascade logic structure and heterogeneity
of individuals’ belief systems are necessary to generate the
phenomenon of strong diversity of final opinions. Competing
logical interdependencies can also play an important role. We
believe these are key new insights and explanation of strong
diversity, as most existing works attribute strong diversity in
connected networks to factors such as individual stubbornness.
Future work will focus on proving the conjecture in Remark 3,
relaxing Assumption 2, asynchronous updating (e.g. gossiping
as studied in [18]), and the effect of the logic matrix on the
convergence rate. State-dependent connectivity in the inter-
personal interactions or logical interdependencies is also of
interest, for which a hybrid framework may be relevant [30].
APPENDIX
We give some definitions and results to be used in the
analysis. The infinity norm and spectral radius of a square
matrix A are denoted by ‖A‖∞ and ρ(A), respectively. For a
matrixA, let |A| be the matrix whose ijth entry is the absolute
value of the ijth entry of A. A square A ≥ 0 is primitive if
∃k ∈ N : Ak > 0 [26, Definition 1.12]. For some A ≥ 0, the
graph G[A] is strongly connected and aperiodic if and only if
A is primitive [26, Proposition 1.35]. The irreducibility of A
(equivalent to strong connectivity of G[A]) implies that if a k
exists such that Ak > 0, then Aj > 0 for all j > k. Last, we
establish the following helpful lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then, G[A],
where A is the matrix in Eq. (8), is strongly connected and
aperiodic if and only if, separately, G[W ] and G[Ci],∀ i are
strongly connected and aperiodic.
Proof. Let C̄ be a nonnegative row-stochastic matrix with the
same zero and non-zero pattern of entries as Ci,∀ i ∈ I,
i.e. C̄ ∼ Ci,∀ i ∈ I. Then, by the lemma hypothesis on
Assumption 2, the graph G[C̄ ⊗W ] has the same vertex and
edge set as G[A], but with different edge weights (including
the fact that all edge weights of G[C̄ ⊗ W ] are positive,
whereas negative edge weights may exist in G[A]). One can
prove that G[C̄ ⊗W ] is strongly connected and aperiodic by
using [31, Theorem 1], and this is equivalent to proving that
G[A] is strongly connected and aperiodic.
A. Theorem 1
The proof has two parts: in Part 1 and Part 2, we prove
convergence for irreducible and reducible Ci, respectively.
Part 1: Consider the case where all the Ci are irreducible
(i.e. G[Ci] is strongly connected). We have that G[W ] and
G[Ci],∀i ∈ I are separately strongly connected and ape-
riodic from Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 (the aperiodicity is a
consequence of the assumption that wii > 0 and cpp,i > 0
for all i ∈ I and p ∈ J ). From [26, Proposition 1.35], we
then conclude that G[A] is strongly connected and aperiodic.
Moreover, every diagonal entry of A is strictly positive.
Using existing results on the Altafini model for strongly
connected networks [10, Theorem 1 and 2], we conclude that
limt→∞ y(t) = y
∗ exponentially fast, where y∗ ∈ Rnm is the
steady-state opinion distribution.
Part 2: Consider now the case where all Ci are reducible,
with Ci having the form in Eq. (9), S , {1, 2, . . . s}, and
sj being integers satisfying
∑s
j=1 sj = m. The matrix A in
Eq. (8) has the following form
A =

Ā11 0 · · · 0





Ās1 Ās2 · · · Āss
 (22)
with block matrix elements Āpq, p, q ∈ S given
Āpq =

Agh Ag,h+1 · · · Ag,h+sq−1










i=1 si−1 +1 and h =
∑q
i=1 si−1 +1 for p, q ∈ S
with s0 = 0. From the decomposition in Eq. (9), we know
that Cpp,i is irreducible for any p ∈ S and i ∈ I, and all the
diagonal entries are positive (see Assumption 1). This implies
that G[Cpp,i] is strongly connected and apediodic.
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We prove the exponential convergence property by induc-
tion. First, for the base case consider the topics in J1, which
are {1, 2, . . . , s1}. Since C11,i is irreducible for all i ∈ I,
we obtain from Part 1 that for all topics k ∈ J1, there holds
limt→∞ yk(t) = y
∗
k exponentially fast, for some y
∗
k ∈ Rn.
We now prove the induction step for topic k in the topic
subset Jp, with p ∈ S and p ≥ 2. Suppose that for all topics
l ∈ ∪p−1j=1Jj , limt→∞ yl(t) = y∗l exponentially fast, where
y∗l is the vector of final opinions. We need to show that for
all topics k in Jp, there exists a vector y∗k ∈ Rn such that
there holds limt→∞ yk(t) = y
∗
k exponentially fast. Look at
the p-th block row of matrix A. Suppose first that Āpq = 0
for q < p. Since Cpp,i is irreducible for any i ∈ I, then by
the analysis in Part 1 of this proof, we conclude that for every
k ∈ Jp, there exists a y∗k ∈ Rn such that limt→∞ yk(t) = y∗k
exponentially fast. Next, suppose to the contrary, that there
exists a q < p such that Āpq 6= 0. Because G[Cpp,i],∀i ∈ I
are strongly connected and aperiodic, one can apply Lemma
1 to obtain that G[Āpp] is strongly connected and aperiodic,
i.e. Āpp is irreducible. Since Āpp is irreducible, |Āpp| is also
irreducible. Because ∃ q < p such that Āpq 6= 0, we conclude
that |Āpp| is row-substochastic. It follows from [32, Lemma
2.8] that ρ(|Āpp|) < 1. Using the triangle inequality, verify
that the ijth entry of |Ākpp| is less than or equal to the ijth








∞ ≤ limk→∞ ‖|Āpp|k‖1/k∞ ,
which in turn implies that ρ(Āpp) ≤ ρ(|Āpp|) < 1. Recall
that at the start of the induction step, we assumed that for all
l ∈ ∪p−1j=1Jj (with p ∈ S and p ≥ 2), there exists y∗l ∈ Rn
such that limt→∞ yl(t) = y
∗
l exponentially fast. Combining
this assumption with the fact that ρ(Āpp) < 1, we conclude
that for every k ∈ Jp, there exists a y∗k ∈ Rn such that
limt→∞ yk(t) = y
∗
k exponentially fast.
The invariance property in which ypi (0) ∈ [−1, 1] for all
i ∈ I and p ∈ J guarantees ypi (t) ∈ [−1, 1] for all t ≥ 0 and
i ∈ I and p ∈ J was proved in [18]. It relies on the fact that∑n
q=1 |cpq,i| = 1 as detailed in Assumption 1.
B. Analysis for Subsection III-B
Here, we present a supporting result that links the struc-
tural balance of the graph G[A] to the structural balance of
G[Ci], i ∈ I, which will be used to help prove the main result
on consensus for irreducible Ci.
First, we introduce additional graph-theoretic concepts. For
a given (possibly signed) graph G, an undirected cycle is a
cycle of G that ignores the direction of the edges, and an
undirected cycle is negative if it contains an odd number
of edges with negative edge weight. A signed graph G is
structurally unbalanced if and only if it has at least one
negative undirected cycle [27].
We now establish several additional properties of how the
entries cij,k of Ck relate to edges in G[A].
Lemma 2. For the graph G[A] with node set V[A] =
{v1, . . . , vnm}, let Vp = {v(p−1)n+1, . . . , vpn}, p ∈ J be
defined as the set of nodes of the subgraph G[App]. Suppose
that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then,
1) For every p ∈ J , G[App] is strongly connected and
aperiodic with positive edge weights.
2) There is an edge from node v(q−1)n+j to v(p−1)n+i if and
only if wij > 0 and cpq,i 6= 0. Moreover, the weight of
the edge the same sign as the sign of cpq,i.
3) If cpq,k 6= 0∀ k ∈ I, then with p 6= q, every node in Vp
has an incoming edge from a node Vq , and every node
in Vq has an outgoing edge to a node in Vp.
Proof. First, recall that Apq , ΓpqW as below Eq. (7).
Item 1): From Assumption 1, we know that cpp,i > 0 ∀ i ∈ I
and p ∈ J . This implies that App ∼ W and App ≥ 0 with
all positive diagonals, which implies that G[App] is strongly
connected and aperiodic.
Item 2): Notice that Apq is nonzero if and only if cpq,i 6=
0, i ∈ I. Moreover, the ijth entry of a nonzero Apq is nonzero
if and only if wij > 0, and has the same sign as cpq,i. Recall
that we defined node subsets Vp = {v(p−1)n+1, . . . , vpn},
p ∈ J for the graph G[A]. It follows that an edge from
node v(q−1)n+j ∈ Vq to v(p−1)n+i ∈ Vp exists if and only
if wij > 0 and cpq,i 6= 0, and has the same sign as cpq,i.
Item 3): This statement is obtained by (i) recalling the
definition of the node set Vp = {v(p−1)n+1, . . . , vpn}, p ∈ J ,
(ii) observing that an irreducible W implies that for any i ∈ I,
there exists a j ∈ I, i 6= j such that wij > 0, and (iii) by
applying Item 2).
We now turn to study of the structural balance of G[A] and
its relation to the structural balance of the G[Ci]s.
Lemma 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
Suppose further that Ci for all i ∈ I are irreducible. The
following hold:
1) If there are no individuals with competing logical in-
terdependencies, as given in Definition 1, then G[A] is
structurally balanced if and only if G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are
structurally balanced.
2) If there are individuals with competing logical interde-
pendences, then G[A] is structurally unbalanced.
Proof. We prove each statement separately.
Part 1: Consider the case where there are no individu-
als with competing logical interdependencies. Since, for any
p, q ∈ J , cpq,i for all i ∈ I are of the same sign, it follows
that all graphs G[Ci] have the same structural balance or
unbalance property. Moreover, because the structural balance
or unbalance property of any graph depends on the sign, and
not the magnitude, of its edge weights, let us consider G[C1]
for convenience. For brevity, we also drop the subscript 1 and
simply write G[C] for Part 1 of this proof, with node set
VC = {vc,1, . . . , vc,m}. To establish the result, we will exploit
Lemma 2. For each p ∈ J , consider the subgraph G[App] of
G[A]. Item 1) of Lemma 2 tells us that every edge in G[App]
has a positive weight, while Item 2) and Item 3) of Lemma 2
establish that the edge weights for all edges from G[Aqq] to
G[App] have the same sign as the sign of the weight for the
edge (vc,q, vc,p) in G[C].
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With these properties in mind, consider a structurally unbal-
anced G[C]; since G[C] is strongly connected, the unbalance
property implies there is at least one negative directed cycle.
Without loss of generality, consider the negative cycle
(vc,p, vc,z1), (vc,z1 , vc,z2), . . . (vc,zr , vc,p) (24)
with z1, . . . zr ∈ J and r ≥ 1. Let u ∈ N be the odd number
of negative edges in the undirected cycle. From Item 2) and
3) of Lemma 2, and using the fact that wii > 0 ∀ i ∈ I, we
conclude that G[A] has an undirected cycle
π =(v(p−1)n+i, v(z1−1)n+i), (v(z1−1)n+i, v(z2−1)n+i), . . . ,
(v(zr)n+i, v(p−1)n+i).
The undirected cycle π contains precisely u edges with nega-
tive weight, which implies that π is a negative cycle. It follows
that G[A] is structurally unbalanced.
Next, consider a structurally balanced G[C], and assume
without loss of generality that the nodes are ordered such that
they can be partitioned into disjoint sets V+ = {vc,1, . . . , vc,s}
and V− = {vc,s+1, . . . , vc,m}, with 1 ≤ s < m. The two sets
have the property that each edge between two nodes in V+ or
V− has positive weight, while each edge between a node in
V+ and a node in V− has negative weight. Without loss of
generality, consider an undirected cycle, π, in G[A] starting
and ending at a node v̄ in the subgraph G[A11]. We are going
to show that any such π is not a negative undirected cycle. If
π traverses only nodes in G[A11], then clearly all edges on the
path have positive weight. Suppose instead that π is such that
it traverses at least one node in each of the subgraphs G[A11],
G[Az1z1 ], . . . ,G[Azrzr ], with z1, . . . zr ∈ J and r ≥ 1 (by the
definition of an undirected cycle, each node in the cycle apart
from v̄ is distinct). If vc,z1 , . . . , vc,zr ∈ V+, then we conclude
from Item 2) and 3) of Lemma 2 that all edges in π have
positive weight. In both cases, π is not a negative undirected
cycle. Now suppose that z1, . . . zk, with k < r, are such that
vc,z1 , . . . vc,zk ∈ V−. Notice that for any two nodes ṽ and
v̂ in the subgraphs G[App], p ∈ {1, . . . , s}, a path from ṽ to
v̂ which traverses nodes in the subgraphs G[Aqq], q ∈ {s +
1, . . . ,m} has an even number of edges with negative weight.
This is because vc,p ∈ V+, p ∈ {1, . . . , s} and vc,q ∈ V−, q ∈
{s+1, . . . ,m}. From the fact that v̄ ∈ G[A11], one can use this
previous property to show that there exist nonnegative integers
u1, . . . , uk such that the number of edges in π with negative
weight is precisely
∑k
v=1 2uv + 2. It follows that there are
an even number of edges with negative weight in π, meaning
π is not a negative undirected cycle. This analysis holds for
every undirected cycle in G[A]. We conclude that there does
not exist a negative undirected cycle in G[A], which implies
that G[A] is structurally balanced.
We have thus proved that there exists an undirected negative
cycle in G[A] if and only if there exists an undirected
negative cycle in G[C], which implies the structural balance
or unbalance of G[A] is the same as that of G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I.
Part 2: Consider now the case when there are individuals
with competing logical interdependencies. Suppose that there
exist individuals j, k such that cpq,j > 0 and cpq,k < 0 has
negative sign (i.e. there are competing logical interdependen-
cies in topic p). From Item 1) of Lemma 2, we know that the
subgraph G[App] is strongly connected and all edges between
nodes within G[App] have positive weight. From Item 2) and
Item 3) of Lemma 2, and because wii > 0 for all i, we observe
that G[A] has an undirected cycle
(v(q−1)n+j , v(p−1)n+j), (v(p−1)n+j , v(p−1)n+z1), . . . ,
(v(p−1)n+zr , v(p−1)n+k), (v(p−1)n+k, v(q−1)n+k),
(v(q−1)n+k, v(q−1)n+zr ), . . . , (v(q−1)n+z1 , v(q−1)n+j)
with z1, . . . zr ∈ I and r ≥ 1. The single negative edge is
(v(p−1)n+k, v(q−1)n+k), which means the undirected cycle is
negative. It follows that G[A] is structurally unbalanced.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
We first prove Statement 1). If there are no competing
logical interdependencies and G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are structurally
balanced, then G[A] is structurally balanced according to
Lemma 3. According to [10, Theorem 1], for almost all initial
conditions the system Eq. (8) converges to a nonzero modulus
consensus, i.e. limt→∞ |yip(t)| = |yjq(t)| 6= 0 for all i, j ∈ I
and p, q ∈ J . It remains to prove that limt→∞ yk(t) =
αk1n,∀k ∈ J .
For a structurally balanced G[A], the nodes vi ∈ V can be
partitioned into two disjoint sets V+ and V−, where every
edge between nodes in the same set has positive weight, and
every edge between nodes of V+ and V− has negative weight.
Item 1) of Lemma 2 implies that for any k ∈ J , the nodes
v(k−1)n+1, . . . , vkn all belong in either V+ or V−. Recalling
that the node v(k−1)n+i corresponds to the variable yik, and
from [10, Theorem 1], it follows that limt→∞ yik(t) = y
j
k(t)
for all i, j ∈ I, and thus limt→∞ yk = αk1n for every k ∈ J .
Statements 2) and 3) can be proved simultaneously. If there
are no competing logical interdependencies, and G[Ci],∀ i ∈
I are structurally unbalanced then according to Lemma 3,
G[A] is structurally unbalanced. Similarly, if there are com-
peting logical interdependencies, then according to Lemma 3,
G[A] is also structurally unbalanced. From [10, Theorem 2],
there holds limt→∞ y(t) = 0nm exponentially fast. This
completes the proof of the theorem.
D. Proof of Corollary 1
Recall from Appendix B that the structural balance or
unbalance property of any graph depends on the sign, and not
the magnitude, of its edge weights. Since G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are
structurally balanced, we can consider G[C1] for convenience.
For brevity, we also drop the subscript 1 and simply write
G[C]. Partition the nodes v1, . . . , vm of G[C] into two disjoint
sets V[C]+ and V[C]− such that every edge between nodes
in the same set has positive weight, and every edge between
nodes of different sets has negative weight.
Since G[A] is structurally balanced, let us also partition the
nodes ṽk of G[A] into two disjoint sets V+ and V− such that
every edge between nodes in the same set has positive weight,
and every edge between nodes of different sets has negative
weight. We know from Lemma 2 Item 1) and Lemma 3 that
the nodes ṽ(p−1)n+1, . . . , ṽpn of G[A] all belong in either V+
or V−. Recall from Item 2) and 3) of Lemma 2 that the weights
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of the edges from subgraph G[Aqq] to subgraph G[App], with
p 6= q and p, q ∈ J , have the same sign as the edges in
G[C] from vq to vp. One can then use the analysis in [10] and
Theorem 2, Statement 1), to verify that αp = αq if vp and vq
are either both in V[C]+ or both in V[C]−. If, on the other
hand, vq ∈ V[C]+ and vp ∈ V[C]−, then αp = −αq .
E. Proof of Theorem 3
First, observe that if Jj = {p} is a singleton, then the block
diagonal matrix Āpp in Eq. (22) is in fact Āpp = App =
ΓppW , where Γpq, p, q ∈ J is defined below Eq. (7). Since
0 < cpp,i < 1 for all i ∈ I, and W is row-stochastic, we
have that ‖App‖∞ < 1 ⇒ ρ(App) < 1. This implies that
(In−App)−1 exists. Letting Ĵp be the set of topics that topic
p logically depends upon, as defined in Eq. (11), the vector













We now focus on proving that y∗p reaches a consensus state if
and only if Eq. (13) holds for some κp ∈ [−1, 1]. Let Rpp =
In−App, and because W is row-stochastic, one obtains that
Apq1n = Γpq1n for any q, p ∈ J and Rpp1n = (In −
Γpp)1n. We use this observation several times below.
Sufficiency: Suppose there exists a κp ∈ [−1, 1] satis-
fying Eq. (13). Since the theorem hypothesises that y∗q =







1n = κp1n. Also, αp = κp.
Necessity: Suppose in order to obtain a contradiction, that
y∗p = αp1n for some αp and there does not exist a κp ∈
[−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (13). Substituting y∗p = αp1n into the









Multiplying both sides by Rpp yields






However, Eq. (26) clearly contradicts the assumption made
at the start of the proof of necessity: there does not exist a
κp ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (13) for all i ∈ I.
F. Proof of Corollary 2
We prove each statement of Corollary 2 separately. First,
note that |αq| ≤ 1, which implies that the quantity on the
right hand side of Eq. (13) is in [−1, 1] for every i ∈ I.
Statement 1): First, observe that In − Γpp = |Γpq|. For
the proof of sufficiency, suppose that there are no competing
logical interdependencies in topic p. Then, αqcpq,i has the
same sign for every i ∈ I and since Ĵp = {q}, κp =
αq sgn(cpq,i) ∈ [−1, 1] satisfies Eq. (13), where the signum
function sgn : R → {−1, 0, 1} satisfies sgn(x) = 1 if x > 0,
sgn(x) = 0 if x = 0, and sgn(x) = −1 if x < 0.
For the proof of necessity, suppose that there are competing
logical interdependencies in topic p, and suppose cpq,1 > 0
and cpq,2 < 0 (see below Eq. (5) on why we can make this
assumption without loss of generality). Then, sgn(αqcpq,1) =
− sgn(αqcpq,2), which implies that there does not exist a κp
such that Eq. (13).
Statement 2): The proof is trivial, since the right hand side
of Eq. (13) is a zero matrix.
Statement 3): The sum constraint in Assumption 1 yields
that cpp,i = cpp,j = cpp and cpqk,i = cpqk,j = cpqk
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , r} and i, j ∈ I. This also implies
that Γpqk = cpqkIn. Thus, Eq. (13) is equivalent to κp =∑r
k=1 αqkcpqk/(
∑r
k=1 |cpqk |). Since αqk ∈ [−1, 1], there
exists a κp ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (13).
Statement 4): Let zk = [cpqk,1, . . . , cpqk,n]
>, and Ξk be
the diagonal matrix with ith diagonal entry being sgn(cpqk,i).








since 1− cpp,i =
∑
q 6=p |cpq,i| for all i. Because we assumed
that |αqu | = |αqv | for all u, v ∈ {1, . . . , r}, let ᾱ , |αqk |.
In the case of (i), where sgn(cpqk,i) = sgn(αqk) for every
k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, it follows that αqkzk = ᾱΞkzk. Rearranging
Eq. (27) yields 0n =
∑r
k=1(κp− ᾱ)Ξkzk. Since ᾱ ∈ [−1, 1],
choosing κp = ᾱ ensures that Eq. (27) holds. The proof for
case (ii) is the same, except that αqkzk = −ᾱΞkzk and one
selects κp = −ᾱ to satisfy Eq. (27).
G. Proof of Theorem 4
First, note that for any p, q ∈ J , Apq1n = Γpq1n,
where Γpq has been defined below Eq. (7). For notational
convenience, let Jj = {j1, . . . , jz} with z ≥ 2. In other
words, we replace for brevity
∑j
i=1 si−1 + p in Eq. (10)
with jp, for p = 1, . . . , z. We proved in Theorem 1 that
ρ(Ājj) < 1 ∀ j ∈ S which, combined with the assumption















where y∗k , limt→∞ yk(t) for k ∈ Jj .
Sufficiency: Let Φ ∈ Rz×z be a diagonal matrix with ith
diagonal entry φk and define
C̄ =
Γj1j1 . . . Γj1jz... . . . ...
Γjzj1 . . . Γjzjz
 . (29)
Observe that
C̄(Φ⊗ In)(1z ⊗ 1n) = C̄(Φ⊗W )(1z ⊗ 1n)
= C̄(Iz ⊗W )(Φ⊗ In)(1z ⊗ 1n)
= Ājj(Φ⊗ In)(1z ⊗ 1n) (30)
with the first equality obtained by recalling that W1n = 1n,
and the last equality obtained by verifying from Eq. (23) that
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Ājj , C̄(Iz⊗W ). If Eq. (15) holds, then by substituting the






 = (Inz − Ājj)−1(Inz − C̄)(Φ⊗ In)1nz
= (Φ⊗ In)1nz, (31)
with the first equality obtained verifying that C̄(φ ⊗ 1n) =
C̄(Φ ⊗ In)(1z ⊗ 1n), and the last equality obtained from
Eq. (30). It follows that y∗k = φk1n for every k ∈ Jj .
Necessity: To obtain a contradiction, suppose that @φ with
each entry having modulus less than or equal to 1 such that
Eq. (15) holds, and (ii) there holds y∗jk = αjk1n for some
αjk ∈ [−1, 1], for all jk ∈ Jj . Note that αkp ∈ [−1, 1], kp ∈
J̃j is a consequence of the invariance property of Eq. (8) (see
Theorem 1). Eq. (28) yields
αj11n...
αjz1n









Let ᾱ be a diagonal matrix with ith diagonal entry αjk .
Recalling that Ājj , C̄(Iz ⊗W ), multiply both sides of
Eq. (32) by Inz− Ājj . Simplifying using calculations similar
to those appearing in Eq. (30) but with ᾱ replacing Φ yields









However, Eq. (33) contradicts the assumption made at the start
of this (necessity) part of the proof: there does not exist a
vector φ such that Eq. (15). One can prove that each entry
of ᾱ in Eq. (33) is less than or equal to 1 by exploiting the
sum constraint on the cpq,i in Assumption 1, and the fact that
αq ∈ [−1, 1] for all q ∈ J̃j . Using calculations similar to those
at the end of Appendix A, one can alsso show that ρ(C̄) < 1,
which establishes the invertibility of Inz − C̄.
H. Proof of Corollary 3
We prove each item separately.
Item 1: This result can be immediately obtained by checking
Eq. (15) with αq = 0 for all q ∈ J̃j .
Item 2: First, note that Ci is of the form in Eq. (9), which
implies that cka,i = 0 for all k ∈ Jj , a > maxJj , and i ∈ I.
Let Ājj be defined as in Eq. (23). Similar to the proof of
Theorem 4, let Jj = {j1, . . . , jz} with z ≥ 2. Supposing that
cjkp,g = cjkp,h = cjkp for jk ∈ Jj and p ∈ J , define
Ĉ =
cj1j1 . . . cj1jz... . . . ...
cjzj1 . . . cjzjz
 . (34)
Then, I−Ājj = Inz−Ĉ⊗W . Since ρ(Ājj) < 1, we obtain







⊗W t. Assumption 1 and the fact that J̃j 6= ∅ implies
that |Ĉ| is row-substochastic. Using calculations similar to
those at the end of Appendix A, one can show that ρ(Ĉ) < 1,





Define for k ∈ {1, . . . z}, α̃jk =
∑








 = α̃⊗ 1n, (35)
where α̃ = [α̃j1 , . . . , α̃jz ]




















since W t is a row-stochastic matrix for any t ∈ N. The right





Rz , which implies that for every jk ∈ Jj , we have y∗jk =
αjk1n for some αjk ∈ [−1, 1].
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